Cinavia Copyright Protection

Holy shit niggers:

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cinavia

The watermarking and steganography facility provided by Cinavia is designed to stay within the audio signal and to survive all common forms of audio transfer, including lossy data compression using discrete cosine transform, MP3, DTS, or Ogg Vorbis. It is designed to survive digital and analogue sound recording and reproduction via microphones, direct audio connections and broadcasting, and does so by using audio frequencies within the hearing range. It is monaural and not a multichannel codec.

o Only a single channel of audio is required to detect the watermark
o The watermark is able to survive re-recording through a microphone
o The watermark can be detected through "the production, duplication, distribution, broadcast, and consumer handling of recorded content"
o Different copies of otherwise identical works can be distinguished

Let's brainstorm ways to extract the waveform pattern from this!

>>1
I actually think this is an useful application, if it were not for the license. It would be the perfect way way to watermark your works, and be able to prove it so. You can uses PGP with this, even embed your signatures for secure communication (you would know all the parties that are actually on a conference, since their transmissions are watermarked).

The real evil is subverting DRM on commodity systems with CPU instructions built-in for looking and alerting these marks. Intel has already done that on the newer CPUs, and can be enabled at the purchaser's request.

In my most honest opinion, this is great for embeded applications, particularly the security sector. One prime example it can be deployed is on mobile communication, at the users or owners discretion.

I had notions ciphers like these existed, but you have confirmed my suspicions. Thanks >>1

>>2

http://www.dvd2hd.com/_dl/cinex_wp_release1.pdf

Here's a whitepaper on detecting the signal. It's actually pretty interesting, and the error correcting codes are pretty damn good.

I'd love to write a program that used this same technique to encode user-specified data into an audio stream and have it remain there no matter what conversion or modification took place.

Sorry, >>1, I got too excited reading the specs, and forgot to answer your request.

It works like any hash cipher, but makes sure that it maintains signature harmonics, so that if the sound is reverbed/modified, because the harmonics are unique values throughout sample, the signature is maintained, even though it has been tampered. You would use matrix mathematics to determined that the sample has the equivalent signature as when the original sample was produced.

It combines block cyphers and vector calculus under matrices, which is awesome.

So about your request, that would be simple. Make a sample without the cipher, copy the sample, apply the cypher on the copy, then compare the two. You can use inverse or subtractively translation of your original sample, to null out the copy, and leaving the cipher-mark to play and re-record.

tl;dr It's possible, just O(4n) of work. And requires you have the original sample to derive its sound. The Advanced Encryption Standard is one prime example of what Cinavia does at the block level.

>>4

From the whitepaper it seems that a large part of the persistence is the fact that it encodes itself between the 400hz and 4000hz spectrum to which the human ear is most sensitive, and this is what encoding programs emphasize when converting audio, and this is what all audio recording equipment is specialized to detect (above everything else).

The signal is apparently perceptible, as well, at least if you've also heard the original sound file.

When media with the watermark is played back on a system with Cinavia detection, its firmware will detect the watermark and check that the device on which it is being played is authorized for that watermark. If the device is not authorized (such as not being an authorized movie projector in the case of a cam bootleg, or not utilizing AACS in the case of a copy of a commercial Blu-ray disc or CSS in the case of a copy of a commercial DVD), a message is displayed (either immediately or after a set duration) stating that the media is not authorized for playback on the device and that users should visit the Cinavia web page for more information.

Computer-savvy users know better than to buy backdoored shit like that, so they only people this might actually affect is iPhone-wielding mouthbreathing retards. Never mind, the only place it's currently implemented is BluRay/media players. Play your movies on a real computer and you've bypassed it.

Also cue DoS attacks by inadvertent triggering of firmware.

>>6

What about when it gets implemented in audio cards, and audio chipsets? Where if the audio output device detects a signal of this sort (where "authorized playback" would have modified it or removed it) it will just not play?

What about when it's implemented in the processor firmware? In the firmware of the audio devices themselves?

>>5
Ah, then that is stupid, especially if the encoding you are using specifically cuts out anything above the human auditory spectrum (e.g. MP3, Vorbis, etc). It should be using random harmonics under functions like vibratos, treble, mixed sonatas, etc. while using the block cipher, all at low amplitudes(volume). To make the sample/cipher more unique, it should allow for internal input variables or functions to add to the complexity (time, some key (e.g. PGP), GUID, salts, etc.).

But if you are saying it is audible, then they might need to update their algorithm, to make as inconspicuous as dither-marks (in image signing/watermarking). To the trained it would appear as re-recorded or lossy re-encoding noise.

>>7

What about when it gets implemented in audio cards, and audio chipsets? Where if the audio output device detects a signal of this sort (where "authorized playback" would have modified it or removed it) it will just not play?
What about when it's implemented in the processor firmware? In the firmware of the audio devices themselves?

Then people will just buy non-backstabbing audio cards/chipsets/CPUs? A lot of people are moving away from Intel due to pro-DRM rumors. Intel is getting away with it because they're gigantic, for any other company it would be corporate suicide.

You can play audio on a Microchip PIC32 and a piezo speaker, are they going to backdoor those too? Even in the worst-case scenario where every CPU company has been bribed into backstabbing their customers, with a sufficiently large group-buy you can still get a non-backstabbing CPU produced.

Sony is getting away with it because they're gigantic, for any other company it would be corporate suicide.

self-fix

>>9
Then people will just buy non-backstabbing [insert product here]

How has that been working out for the past 20 years? The average consumer won't know anything about this, they will buy the thing that's most readily available, and the thing that's marketed most.

>>11
And they should pay the price of their ignorance.

>>8

To the trained it would appear as re-recorded or lossy re-encoding noise.

That is apparently what it sounds like. I don't buy Blu-Rays or watch movies so I wouldn't know, but from the whitepaper they say it introduces artifacts that sound like low-bitrate compression noise.

>>6
Why I mentioned that the evil would be if the technology is used on DRM systems, where the consumer was not told it had. I also gave why this is a great technology, and what market this is actually great for, not the copyright mafia.

>>7
The hardware should not be doctored with the specification if not detailed to the consumer. This technology should only affect niche markets. If it does get subverted into commodity devices without clear labeling/description, it would prove disastrous to everyone. The manufacturer would get lots of returns for non-functioning hardware, because some streams of data had the same signature as one of the DRM audio streams, thus locking the device is some fashion. The customer would obviously object, and return when something was not playing. And the original author would get harassed for not being able to properly distribute the work at a satisfactory level the users would want (includes being able to play the work at their leisure, if at all).

IOW, the problem is with DRM implementations on devices the user did not request, not the audiomark algorithm.

In your scenario, stop buying hardware that has DRM in it, even if it is disabled, if you do not want/need it. There are other fields that would demand his technology, and would adopt it for those reasons, not commodity hardware (e.g. secure conference telecommunication, marking works for verifiability, authentications systems, audio operations (military applications), etc.).

I'll expand a bit on that, actually. For a group-buy to be successful and for the price to be very decent, you really only need a few dozen thousand participants, a hundred thousand tops. These 100,000 enlightened yids are just one to a hundred goyim, and it really doesn't matter if the dumb goyim buy backstabbing hardware.

>>14

e.g. secure conference telecommunication,

Exactly how would that work? You can't prevent a participant from recording what they hear, and if multiple participants collude they can make it extremely difficult to identify the exact source of the leak.

marking works for verifiability

gpg2 --detach-sign work

authentications systems

I have to admit that audio authentication (and using audio channels to transfer small amounts of data) does sound kind of cool and maybe even useful.

IOW, the problem is with DRM implementations on devices the user did not request, not the audiomark algorithm.

It's not [i]really[/i] DRM, it's just cryptography or digital locks. See https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#DigitalLocks

If it does get subverted into commodity devices without clear labeling/description, it would prove disastrous to everyone. The manufacturer would get lots of returns for non-functioning hardware, because some streams of data had the same signature as one of the DRM audio streams, thus locking the device is some fashion. The customer would obviously object, and return when something was not playing.

Even more fun than that; people would isolate an exact sample of the signal and then blast it through loudspeakers in public places, thus disrupting everyone's recording devices. The possibilities for abuse are endless.

>>13
Ah, then thanks. It does many of the things I have theorized about, but never got around to making one. It's been there for the past 3 years, so I assume some DRM devices have implementations of Cinavia (a pun on "Cine via?"). But like in theoretical example of supplanted devices with DRM, it would be unfavorable for everyone, like >>9 concluded as well.

>>16
It would be used for identifying the transmission is genuine, an authentication mechanism. So we know it comes from the proper speaker, not an impersonation. In a conference, you would allot how many participants will actually be joining, create ephemeral identities for each with this algorithm, and pool them to the same forum. Thus securing the identity of the participants from impersonators.

Leaking then would be an insecurity/weakness of of the participants, not the authentication system. You can make the outgoing transmission, what the participants receive, also have an unique session audiomark, making the recording identifiable on the leaked audio. There's nothing in the specifications that dampens the quality of identifiabl-ity with multiple audiomarks.

gpg2 --detach-sign work

We both know ANYONE can copy and distribute a public key, and the work. But the specification is to embed an audiomark INTO the work, that can be verified by itself as the only input. Which is why I mention more than once, it would be awesome if you can apply PGP into this specification, additionally optional or not.

It's not [i]really[/i] DRM, it's just cryptography or digital locks.

No, the correct line is the one below #DigitalLocks:
https://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#DigitalRightsManagement

“Digital Rights Management” (abbreviated “DRM”) refers to technical mechanisms designed to impose restrictions on computer users. [...] Good alternatives include “Digital Restrictions Management,”

I used the abbreviation of the technical concept of hardware built with restrictions for the user, which has its own market and necessity (e.g. security systems). When I use it, I mean restricted access controlled devices/hardware. The commonly accepted words for commodity hardware sold to the masses with such restrictions are called Digital rights management (DRM) devices (whether intentionally described on the device or not by the manufacturer|seller). If you do not concur with the commonly accepted definition, be sure to let wikipedians know, or just edit the article:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Digital_Rights_Management

_ _

people would isolate an exact sample of the signal and then blast it through loudspeakers in public places, thus disrupting everyone's recording devices. The possibilities for abuse are endless.

That is one hell of a specific experiment to carryout, if the devices had microphones, and the input received should be reviewed by the implementation of the technology. Not all devices will be used the same with this technology; specially for all fields.

>>17

We both know ANYONE can copy and distribute a public key, and the work. But the specification is to embed an audiomark INTO the work, that can be verified by itself as the only input. Which is why I mention more than once, it would be awesome if you can apply PGP into this specification, additionally optional or not.

Before you get to that you have another, harder, problem. You must find an invariant of an audio sample such that it doesn't change on re-encodings, and that if another audio sample that has the same invariant, then it "sounds" a lot like the original. I strongly suspect that the invariants, if they exist, are different for voice and music (for example).

After you've done that, the problem is then to cryptographically sign the invariant and embed it into the audio sample in a way that doesn't change its invariant.

does so by using audio frequencies within the hearing range

*music* THIS SONG PROTECTED BY CINAVIA *music*

>>19
Subliminal messaging. That's how the jews get you.

*music* BUY MORE INTEL PROCESSORS YOU DUMB GOYS *music*

>>20 learn2kike, bro. the plural of dumb cattle is ``goyim''.

>>21
Actually, cattle is the plural of "kine."

>>18, please see >>4,8

>>19
https://youtu.be/5-OjTPj7K54?t=5m22s

>>23
That song is amazingly good.

>>24
Why I even bothered to post it as an example, of how we sign/mark audio works. It is still the proper to do so, but it is better to cover the whole audio with this audiomark (like white noise in radio, mother universe's signature). Truly, Universe refracted the world in functions of vectors(forces). Conway's Game of Life exemplifies the hypothesis.

>>25
I don't give a damn about the copyright notice (okay, I did chuckle at that), the song was good.